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Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms LLC, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 78 (Oct. 4, 2018)1
CIVIL APPEAL: RELIEF UNDER NRCP 60(b)(1)
Summary
The Court determined that relief under NRCP 60(b)(1) is appropriate when litigants: (1)
promptly apply to remove judgement, (2) not intend to delay proceedings, (3) lack knowledge of
procedural requirements; and (4) act in good faith. Further, the Court concluded that a district court
must consider the relevant facts, including the difficulties faced by pro se litigants, when
determining to grant or deny NRCP 60(b)(1) relief.
Background
Enrique Rodriguez won a judgement for $6,051,589.38 against Fiesta Palms, LLC, for
injuries he sustained in 2006 at the Fiesta Palms sportsbook. In 2014, the Court reversed the
judgment and remanded for a new trial. Subsequently, Rodriguez’s counsel moved to withdraw
from representation and the district court granted the motion. The district court granted two
continuances for Rodriguez to secure counsel.
After Rodriguez secured counsel, the district court granted two more continuances, one to
accommodate Rodriguez and the other to accommodate Fiesta Palms. Rodriguez’s new counsel
moved to withdraw a month before trial and the district court granted the motion. The district court
then pushed the trial date to allow Rodriguez to secure new counsel.
Rodriguez failed to file responses to Fiesta Palm’s numerous pretrial motions, including a
motion to dismiss. At a hearing on a motion in limine filed by Fiesta Palms, Rodriguez appeared
pro se and requested a six-month continuance to secure new counsel. The district court denied the
motion and warned Rodriguez to abide by future procedural requirements and respond to motions
filed by Fiesta Palms with or without representation. Rodriguez filed nothing before the next
motion hearing and again requested a continuance to secure counsel. In April 2016, the district
court granted Fiesta’s motion to dismiss.
In October 2016, five months and three weeks later, Rodriguez moved to set aside the
district court’s order pursuant to NRCP 60(b) alleging various medical issues and difficulty of
obtaining counsel. After considering the factors set forth in Yochum v. Davis,2 the district court
denied Rodriguez’s NRCP 60 motion. Rodriguez appealed.
Discussion
The Court reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Rodriguez’s motion to set aside the judgment under NRCP 60(b). NRCP 60(b)(1) states that a
district court “may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgement order,
or proceeding” on the grounds of “mistake, inadvertence surprise, or excusable neglect.”3 The
Court used the four-factor framework from Yochum to analyze whether the district court abused
its discretion in denying Rodriguez’s motion for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief:
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Whether Rodriguez acted promptly
A motion for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief must be filed within a reasonable period and not more
than six months after the order was served.4 The six-month marker represents the “extreme limit
of reasonableness.”5 Since Rodriguez’s motion was filed just before the six-month time limit, the
Court found that the district court was more fit to determine whether Rodriguez’s delay was
excusable. The Court further concluded the record supports the district court’s determination that
the delay was not excusable.
Whether Rodriguez intended to delay the proceedings
The district court did not make a finding as to whether Rodriguez intended to delay the
proceedings. However, the Court found an inference of an intent to delay because of Rodriguez’s
numerous requests for continuances to secure counsel and his refusal to proceed without
representation.
Whether Rodriguez lacked knowledge of the procedural requirements
The Court agreed with the district court’s finding that Rodriguez was aware of the
procedural requirements imposed upon him. Notices of the legal requirements were mailed to
Rodriguez’s home address. Rodriquez personally witnessed the district court grant Fiesta Palm’s
motions because he failed to file written oppositions. Further, Rodriguez filed a motion before
without assistance of counsel, so he was capable of filing oppositions without assistance of
counsel. The Court noted that ignorance of the law cannot protect pro se litigants from the
consequences of failing to abide by procedural requirements.
Whether Rodriguez acted in good faith
The district court made no finding whether Rodriguez acted in “good faith.” Thus, the
Court declined to consider the fourth Yochum factor.
Conclusion
The Court acknowledged that it affords wide discretion to the district court to make
determinations relating to NRCP 60(b)(1) motions. Here, the Court found that the district court
did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision based on
Yochum factors, which favored denial of Rodriguez’s NRCP 60(b)(1) relief.
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